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Introduction
On 19 December 2018 the UN General 
Assembly approved the Global Compact 
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(GCM), with 152 votes in favor, five against 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, 
United States), 12 abstentions (Algeria, 
Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, 
Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, 
Singapore, Switzerland), and 24 countries 
not voting (UN, 2018). The GCM builds 
on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (UN, 2015) and on the New 
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
2016 (of which it aims to implement Annex 
II) (UN, 2016). 
After the preamble, the first part of the 
GCM contains the vision of the pact with 
10 guiding principles: people-centredness; 
international cooperation; respect for 
national sovereignty; respect for the rule 
of law, due process and access to justice 
as a fundamental element to all aspects 
of migration governance; sustainable 
development; human rights; a gender-
responsive and child-sensitive approach; 
and a whole-of-government and whole-of-
society approach.
The following part of the document 
includes 23 objectives that paint a general 
picture of regulation for the conditions of 
migration. Some of them may be useful to 
prevent and combat torture by: providing 
accurate and timely information at all stages 
of migration; ensuring that all migrants 
have proof of legal identity and adequate 
documentation; enhancing availability and 
flexibility of pathways for regular migration; 
facilitating fair and ethical recruitment and 
safeguarding conditions that ensure decent 
work; addressing and reducing vulnerabilities 
in migration; strengthening the transnational 
response to the smuggling of migrants; 
preventing, combating and eradicating 
trafficking of persons in the context of 
international migration; managing borders 
in an integrated, secure and coordinated 
manner; using migration detention only 
as a last resort; providing access to basic 
services for migrants; eliminating all forms 
of discrimination; and promoting evidence-
based public discourse to shape perceptions 
of migration. 
The last part of the GCM identifies, in 
detail, the commitments and the actions 
needed to achieve all 23 objectives.
On torture
During the negotiations, Europe 
emphasized the responsibility of the 
sending countries in the ambit of returns 
and readmissions, with the legal obligation 
for States to take back their nationals. This *) University of Venice
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element was incorporated into Objective 
21: “Cooperate in facilitating safe and 
dignified return and readmission, as well 
as sustainable reintegration.” This is a 
very important point regarding (the risk 
of) torture that must be treated carefully.1 
For this reason, within Objective 21 the 
following sentence was inserted: 
“We commit to facilitate and cooperate 
for safe and dignified return and to 
guarantee due process, individual assessment 
and effective remedy, by upholding the 
prohibition of collective expulsion and of 
returning migrants when there is a real and 
foreseeable risk of death, torture, and other 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
or punishment, or other irreparable harm, 
in accordance with our obligations under 
international human rights law.” 
If this is the only point in the GCM where 
torture is mentioned, the situation is 
somewhat different in the case of Global 
Compact on Refugees (GCR), issued by the 
UNHCR and approved on December 17th 
2018 (UN, 2018). In the GCR the use of 
torture and inhuman treatment is explicitly 
called into question. It calls for a greater 
capacity to address the specific needs of 
people as survivors of torture and contains 
important provisions on the support 
provided to torture victims. In the chapter 
on reception (section «Addressing Specific 
Needs»), the GCR urges: 
“The capacity to address specific needs is 
a particular challenge, requiring additional 
resources and targeted assistance. Persons 
1 Maijcher proposes six indicators which can help 
assess the human rights compliant implementa-
tion of commitments under Objective 21; avail-
able at https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2019/04/16/
gcm-indicators-objective-21-cooperate-in-facili-
tating-safe-and-dignified-return-and-readmission-
as-well-as-sustainable-reintegration
with specific needs include: children, including 
those who are unaccoçmpanied or separated; 
women at risk; survivors of torture, trauma, 
trafficking in persons, sexual and gender-
based violence, sexual exploitation and abuse 
or harmful practices”.
Torture victims are qualified as persons with 
specific needs, which means that States will 
establish “mechanisms for identification, 
screening and referral of those with specific 
needs to appropriate and accessible 
processes and procedures.” In the chapter on 
meeting needs and supporting communities 
(section «Health»), the GCR urges States 
and relevant stakeholders “to contribute 
with resources and expertise to expand 
and enhance the quality of national health 
systems to facilitate access by refugees and 
host communities, including (…) survivors 
of trafficking in persons, torture, trauma or 
violence, sexual and gender-based violence 
(…)”. Thus, in the GCR torture victims 
are a specific beneficiary within the public 
policies towards refugees.
Potential and positive aspects of the GCM
The GCM acknowledges international 
migration as a structural and global 
phenomenon and as one of the most 
significant social issues of our time, which 
should be tackled using a global approach. 
It is the first world pact on migration and 
aims, through multilateralism, to build a 
collective and shared response. It aims to 
tackle migration in a dynamic way, with 
a consideration of the different steps of 
the migration process (e.g., emigration 
and immigration). It adopts a multi-
dimensional perspective, which considers 
the different aspects of the migration 
phenomenon (e.g., work, health, access to 
services, family, rights, and remittances) 
and of the social life of emigrants and 
immigrants (hereafter “migrants”).
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In times of globalizing anti-immigration 
policies and discourses, the GCM recognizes 
the right to emigrate and be welcomed to 
another country with decent treatment. 
It discusses respect for migrants and their 
rights and the fact that they deserve to see 
their dignity recognized in any situation 
or context. This point is important as it 
entails a political commitment and legal 
influence. The resolutions by the UN 
General Assembly are not legally binding 
as they invite States to adopt them, yet they 
may have (limited) legal force as, in specific 
matters, they may be considered sources of 
international customary law. Moreover, the 
GCM includes specific organizational rules, 
procedures, management and control bodies, 
along with specific goals with corresponding 
concrete actions. Consequently, courts 
and civil society have a further tool for 
progressing the rights of migrants. The “war 
on migrants” is a factor in the increasing 
use of torture towards them. The GCM’s 
concept of migration, whereby migrants 
are given full dignity and social citizenship, 
may facilitate the prevention of torture and 
inhuman or degrading abuse. 
Limitations and issues
Although the GCM provides some 
precise instructions and indicators for 
implementing and monitoring progress, 
some of the principles it presents, although 
grounded in admirable values, already have 
their own operational tools in international 
conventions and fundamental charters. This 
presents two issues. 
Firstly, the GCM confirms, even in 
its title, the distinction between “regular” 
and “irregular” migration, from which 
the difference in rights for the two 
categories of migrants is drawn. There is 
no rejection of the socially created category 
of undocumented, “irregular,” “illegal” 
migrants. Instead, there are traces of 
criminalization of migrants, as shown by the 
points on the detention of undocumented 
migrants and on the standardization or 
sharing of the biometric data of migrants. 
Article thirteen states that detention 
should be a last-resort measure but it is not 
explicitly forbidden, even for minors.
Secondly, the GCM erred in their 
presentation of “regular migration” and 
“irregular migration.” Documented 
migration contains in itself the full 
protection of “regular” migrants. A 
rationale is not provided as to why a further 
framework for their protection is needed. 
Thus the issue here is undocumented 
migration in a context of deep global 
inequalities, a structural economic crisis, and 
repressive policies against migrants taking 
place in several parts of the world. 
As for undocumented migration, the 
GCM states that Member States shall 
promote legal channels for migration and, 
to this end, it encourages the identification 
of specific political goals and good 
practices. However, States’ commitment 
remains somewhat vague. At the same time, 
the GCM establishes, as a priority, the 
prevention (also in the sense of struggle 
and countering) of “irregular” migration. 
In this way, many States will have the 
possibility to reinforce their borders, to 
encourage “border cooperation,” to enter 
into agreements on the externalization of 
borders, closing borders, repatriations, 
and readmissions. In the balance between 
“States’ prerogatives and economic 
interests” and “human rights,” the former 
prevails on the latter.
The issue of undocumented migration 
has raised opposition, especially among 
countries against the GCM. And it remains 
unresolved in practice. Article 25 (Objective 
9 «Strengthen the transnational response 
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to smuggling of migrants») binds States 
“to ensure that migrants shall not become 
liable to criminal prosecution for the fact 
of having been the object of smuggling, 
notwithstanding potential prosecution for 
other violations of national law”: it provides 
the possibility of enlarged reception and 
rights to all migrants, irrespective of the 
differences in migration status and legal 
condition. Article 31 (Objective 15 «Provide 
access to basic services for migrants») 
confirms this concept: “We commit to 
ensure that all migrants, regardless of their 
migration status, can exercise their human 
rights through safe access to basic services,” 
while article 20 (Objective 4 «Ensure that 
all migrants have proof of legal identity 
and adequate documentation») entails the 
commitment by States “to fulfil the right 
of all individuals to a legal identity by 
providing all our nationals with proof of 
nationality and relevant documentation” 
without distinction between regular and 
irregular migrants. However, it is not clear 
how the GCM would promote “regular” 
migration versus “irregular” migration, 
which does not have an international legal 
definition. Considering that such topics 
and distinctions remain a prerogative of 
States as provided for by article 15 (Section 
«Unity of purpose»): “Within their sovereign 
jurisdiction, States may distinguish between 
regular and irregular migration status, 
including as they determine their legislative 
and policy measures for the implementation 
of the Global Compact, taking into account 
different national realities, policies, priorities 
and requirements for entry, residence and 
work, in accordance with international law.” 
The GCM, therefore, fails to address 
the crucial matter—the regulation and 
normalization of undocumented and under-
documented migration—in a clear and 
straightforward fashion. The opposition 
of several Western countries, mainly from 
Europe, has entailed the downsizing of 
the initial drafts. The opening on family 
reunification was limited (it would entail 
a social rooting of migrant populations, 
which increases their social value and 
creates social transformations in receiving 
countries); the reference to the flexible 
conversion of visas was eliminated as it 
would make migration and migrant workers 
less constrained and bonded. In essence, 
several aspects have been downsized, so 
much so, that according to Groenendijk, 
“the level of aspiration of the text is clearly 
below the level of rights granted in the 
current EU migration directives to migrants 
from outside the EU. Hence, the Compact 
could be used to legitimize restrictive 
immigration policies in the EU.”2 
Furthermore, the GCM does not tackle 
two other crucial points. Firstly, it should 
be considered how migration policies are 
tightly connected with national economic 
growth—developing welcoming inward 
migration policies, for example, is often 
a function of a need for labor market; in 
this function, they influence the conditions 
of migration and of migrants. Secondly, 
there is a lack of attention to the structural 
determinants of contemporary migrations 
from the Global South to the North of the 
world, including: global inequalities and 
polarized development; industrialization and 
mechanization of agriculture in Asia, South 
America and Africa; land grabbing; external 
debt, mass privatization and restructuring 
plans; wars, civil wars, and local conflicts; 
and environmental degradation. Although 
article two states that it is necessary to 
minimize the adverse drivers and structural 
2 See https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/11/26/gcm-
commentary-objective-5 (5.12.2018)
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factors that compel people to leave their 
country of origin, the causes—which are 
becoming increasingly acute— are not 
considered seriously enough. 
A global migration policy needs to 
consider the world labor market, global 
capital and the deeper causes of migration. 
The notion that a global migration 
policy, the criteria for which are innately 
subjective, could be successful without this 
is perplexing. One could argue that the 
convergence of national migration policies 
into one global migration policy could still 
be positive, but it depends on its features and 
orientation. Currently, it seems to be within 
the paradigm of the traditional governance 
of migrations and its tools (i.e., soft law, 
international agencies, control, privatization 
of international law).
Finally, the GCM is not legally binding 
and it has very limited legal power. It 
recognizes and confirms the primacy 
of individual States in the control of 
migrations, implying that it does not 
attempt to weaken national sovereignty. The 
point of interests for States (e.g., control 
and security) seeks to continue the primacy 
of national sovereignty, whilst also retaining 
the protection of migrants. Why, then, did 
some States, which do not lack influence, 
abstain or vote against the GCM for the 
sake of national sovereignty?
Supporters and detractors
States’ reservations about the GCM are 
manifold. They particularly include the 
following: it favors uncontrolled migration; 
there are fears that there will be an invasion 
from Global South to North of the world, as 
it provides that migration shall be considered 
a fundamental right, so that States cannot 
curb arrivals by law; the right to migration 
and to receiving decent treatment will lead 
to mass migrations from poor countries 
(i.e., the brain and brawn drain); it limits 
national sovereignty; and it cancels the 
distinction between economic migrants 
and political refugees by considering them 
at the same level. Among countries against 
the GCM, we see the sovereigntist bloc (the 
Visegrad group—Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia—along with Austria 
and Bulgaria)3 together with the USA,4 
Australia,5 and Israel.6 Considerable doubts 
were also expressed by Italy, Switzerland 
(where a parliamentary debate is in 
progress), Belgium, and Brazil (uncertain 
on the appropriate decision to take). These 
countries—currently the champions of the 
“stop migration” discourse and policies—
want migration policies to be the exclusive 
competence of national States; they are 
not against neo-liberal globalization, but 
would rather have a new nationalization 
of the State to compete in the world 
economy and redefine the hierarchies of the 
international division of labor. Regarding 
migration, for several States, this does 
not mean completely stopping migration 
as such, but rather making a strict (i.e., 
professional, political, social) selection of 
migration movements, to achieve restrictive 
and punishing politics in the name of 
utilitarianism and criminalization, to pursue 
a model of subordinate integration of 
migrants in the name of social and symbolic 
inferiority. Many of those who oppose the 
3 See http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/eu-states-exit-
from-the-global-compact-on-migration-a-breach-
of-loyalty (7.3.2019)
4 See https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8841 
(7.1.2019).
5 See https://www.ft.com/content/88a475c6-ed37-
11e8-89c8-d36339d835c0 (7.1.2019).
6 See https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20181121-israel-refuses-to-sign-interna-
tional-migration-pact/ (7.1.2019).
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GCM fear that the decent treatment of all 
migrants (documented, undocumented, 
under-documented) will not protect their 
real interests, inter alia possessing a cheap 
labor force with limited rights, thus allowing 
them to define the conditions of migration in 
accordance with market demands. 
The GCM has also attracted some left-
wing criticism, which views the GCM as a 
symptom of neo-liberal globalization that 
opportunistic capitalists can exploit, and 
implicitly calls for the closure of borders and 
the halt of migrations.
Among the supporters, international 
institutions and multilateral organizations 
have underlined several benefits for 
economic growth and social development, 
deriving from organized migration, 
while groups belonging to the no-border 
movement finally see the beginnings of an 
acknowledgment of free movement. Yet, 
the real issue is not the free movement or 
the right to circulate, but rather a two-fold 
matter. Firstly, the deep and structural 
causes of migration (forcing people to leave 
their country, thus not “the right to flee” 
but rather “the duty to flee”). Secondly, the 
unequal conditions and rights of migrants in 
the receiving countries, despite open borders 
and free movement.
Conclusion 
The GCM appears to represent a tool 
to manage migration in the context of 
a globalized economy and international 
migrations taking place across the world 
in an era of structural crisis. Despite this 
complex milieu, it endeavors to balance two 
social forces. On one hand, the interests of 
the market and of national States, and on the 
other, the rights and interests of migrants. 
The section on the rights of migrants 
is mainly the result of the mobilization, 
resistance and the struggle of migrants, 
associations, and social movements. It 
attempts to extend equality, rights and the 
protection of migrants as much as possible. 
The section on economic and State interests 
is limited, due to structural factors, in the 
extension of rights and equality because of 
the central role of the market. In the next 
few months and years, when the GCM will 
be implemented, we will have a chance to 
observe how such matters will develop. 
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